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COOPERATIVE SECURITY: THE NUCLEAR STRATEGY FOR AN UNCERTAiN WORLD
INTRODUCTIUN
Nucfear weapons must be dramatrcahy reduced, d not elunmated, and greater rehance must be placed on conventtonal capabrlmes But the reductton questton ts how deep, how fast, and how much risk
Amertca is wdlmg to tolerate The post Cold War world has allowed Amertca to place rts nuclear forces in a closet and largely ignore the need to evolve a new nuclear strategy that meets the chalenges of a much d$"ent world Russra 1s on a path of soctetat reform with the lowest ever mtent of usmg theu masstve I nuclear arsenal. Thus cooperatrve relauonshrp rs a welcome change after 40 years of on-edge co~frontauon Amenca IS now the dormnate superpower wtth the masstve challenge to reshape new secFty arrangements 111 a world that welcomes such change. However, this fresh-atr of cooperatron aIso offers the luxury to cease grapplmg wtth the 40 year nuclear debate and neglect evolvmg its stmtegy Thus IS $ reckless posmon now widely assumed by many pohcy makers and m&try leaders. I / Thankfully the world has already emerged from the bipolar, adversarrai construct and is swiftly entermg a mulupoiar arrangement which promises cooperattve relanonshrps Conventumal mrhtary faes have bridged these constructs by shafting toward mformatmn-dommate, prectston warfare that fits very nicely But the evolvmg role of nudear forces has been neglected Nuclear weapons seem to be even more 1 troublesome and hard to relate to the new geostrategtc context. They simply do not fit wuh the Gulf War's de& new paradtgm of a sterrle, precrsmn-attack m&ary mstrument that leaves very IntIe collateral mess Cu7"f pohcy makers would rather ignore the task of evolvmg a nuclear strategy and opt to put all then nattonal securny "eggs" in the convenaonal military capabthttes basket
But the Cold War's hand-off to a precrston-attack paradrgm has yet to elimmate the nuclear threat, nor 'the need to mamtam credrble nuclear forces The fact that the nation's survival IS at nsk --despne the lowiprobabrhty of actual use --means nuclear weapons are the nation's highest security issue and strongest military power mstrument The emerging world order faces no greater challenge than the secure dtswsmon of nuclear weapons As with the conventional force transaton, the future nuclear construct must exist on the foundation of a sound, evolved strategy It IS time for the US to see the nuclear age through this transtron and serve the unprecedented opportumty for greater world secunty Amenca must advocate an entrreiy new nuciear strategy for an uncertam 21st century-Cooperative Securq But It IS esienttal to first understand the lessons of the nuclear strategy evoiutton which helps frame the proper construct for the future NUCLEAR STRATEGY EVOLUTION I Hnoshtma and Nagasaki unleashed the nuclear geme and wnhm a few short years, the world po@rrzed mto an East-West standoff Natton's were now dangerously at odds, threatenmg each other with I the most devastatmg weapons devrsed by man The great challenge was to create a nuclear strategy that 1 / could serve defhxte pohtxal objectives without tnggermg a holocaust. Nuclear strategres were largely m the hands of ctvrlian leaders smce the character of such wart&e dnectly mvolved internatronal pohtms m expne crisis (1) Its destructtveness grew well beyond the mihtary leader's operatronal and tactxal objectrves.
The growmg Cold War and unpact of the Berim Blockade forced the mcluston of atomtc weapons into Amenca's war plans, desptte Presnient Truman's reluctance to use them m combat. Presrdent Truman I I stated m 1947, "I don't thmk we ought to use these thmy unless we absolutely have to it IS a temble dung to order the use of somethrng that IS so tembly destructtve beyond anythmg we have ever had" (2) I Thq Soviet's successful 1949 nuclear test spelled the end of US nuclear advantage and the need for a focused strategy to address the growing hosnle nature of communtsm. 50 years ago m a comer office of I the Nattonal War College, George Keenan drafted the NSC-68 Contamment Strategy to match the Soviets on all fronts But Kennan focused on reactmg to Soviet mtentrons, to what he believed they would actually I do, 'despite their standmg mtlttary capab~lrty Paul Nttze disagreed. conszdermg such a course too grave a risk to national security and succeeded m refocusing the contamment strategy to match Sovtet capabrhtres / first! This led to the development of the hydrogen bomb to reestablish US nuclear supertorq and the I reburldmg of conventronai capabtiitres, spurred by the Korean War outbreak Kennan's emphasis on hkehhood of use was put aside (3)
The Eisenhower Admmistratron rnhertted from Prestdent Truman a mixed foundation for nuclear strategy By developing the hydrogen bomb Amerxa was cat-q mg much further than the atomic bomb Itself the policy of extermmatmg cmlian populatrons" (4) Converseiy. because Western peoples would eventually face thus threat of extermmatmn, it was fortunate Truman had already prepared conventronal fotces to defend Western mterests far less dependent on nuclear weapons Taken together, thus formed the long-term vtew that the rok of nuclear weapons was to deter then use by the enemy (5) Both nauons began to respect nuclear war as unacceptable and placed u at a level well above conventtonal tolerance Foster Dulles announced that Amenca would deter future aggressIon by dependmg "pnmanly upon a great capacity to retahate, mstantly, by means and at places of our own choosmg" (6) Unfortunately, thy smeegy was generally mterpreted as a threat to devastate Soviet and Chmese economic and pohacal I centers m response to any aggressron, no matter how hrmted. This interpretatton was not completely accurate and the Eisenhower Admmistration failed to dispel it. It was never envlsmned the US would tmmedtately tum any small-scale conf?ontatton mto an ah-out nuclear war (7 Presrdent Ersenhower commented that "where these dungs are used strtctly on mrhtary targets and for sm$y mrhtary purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn't be used just exactly as you would a bullet or anything else " But this oprmon soon changed firmly back to the view that these weapons cannot be used I like, conventronal forces Then widespread destructton and pervasive after-effects could not be tolerated in conventional-use terms (S) President Kennedy inherited a strategy for general nuclear war mvolvtng a massive and undrscnmmattng attack on the peoples of the Sovret Umon. China. and Eastern Europe: there was no other opnon Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara belreved that If nuclear war occurred every effort must be made to ltmrt damage to crvrhans A different strategy was needed Yet hrs analysis of large CIVII defense programs showed the advantages strll he wnh the offense Developing effecuve defenses would most hkely fail and be a provocative act to the Sov~ers. Hence, -McNamara put his efforts mto remforcmg stab&y through the Mutual Assured Destructron strategy -a counterforce, second-smke capabllny to avytd the mass destruction of cities and c~~lutn populanons (9) Essentially, Mutual Assured Destruction was described as "the abrlity to deter a d&berate nuclear atqck upon the US or rts alhes by mamtammg at all rimes a clear and unmtstakable abtlity to Inflict an I unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor" (IO) Tlus second-stnke strategy was made possible I $ugh the development of survrvabie systems ICBMs deployed and drspersed 111 hardened 40s and 1 SLDMs hidden m submarmes under the seas. These systems allowed a credible second strdce capabrhty and the option to avotd a smgle, massive stie mcludmg populatrons. But MAD suffered not gust from ns title, but also from crmclsm of it SalI threatening anothers poptdahon rather than defendmg one's on Yet I this' seemed the best nuclear strategy available as any other course would lead to instability Further, as eut&td the hmrted nuclear stnice arena away from the rmmeduue European battietield and turn the course I of a land war By the close of the Cold War, nuclear thmkers had strll f&led to develop a smgle, convmcmg strategy to fight a nuclear war should deterrence fat1 The nattonal secunty strategy challenge would be much easier m a world that was more dependent on conventtonal forces and less rehant on the I razor-edge mtensny of nuclear weapons ( 16) There are two pnme lessons that can be gleaned from these agomzmg years of strategy debate.
Ftrsc. It IS much more easy to plan for and control the level of conventtonal ~\ar vtolence than a nuclear war Clvthan and mthtary leaders are much more comfortable with the con\entronai paradigm &clear weapons are too devastatmg, unforgrvmg, and difficult to just@ then actual use That m meifpresmd a revolution m m&ny affars that leaders vtgorously wrestled wtth but never mastered. That revoIuhonary challenge IS now bemg largely Ignored Conventronai weapons are much more escalatton controIIable.
to[crabIe, and acceptable by the will of the people Further, as technology has advanced prectston weapons have srgntficantly reduced the collateral damage factor to create a new "stertIe" form of warfare I thqt leaders happriy embrace
I
The second lesson IS rooted in capabtiitv Deterrence was v~ctortous m the Cold War not as a I re&lt of a perfectiy designed strategy It prevailed because both natton's held awesome, on-alert nuclear fol;c"" that were ready to respond w&m seconds. Ths posttion of nuclear strength -on the runways, m I the aios, and under the seas --was the stark reality that made both natrons "sweat" and allowed these I evoivmg strategtes to be acceptable by all. Many leaders, especiaIly miittaty, are too steeped m then new prectsron-attack revolutton to apprectate thrs fact. The Chnton Admmlstratmn correctly places dommate relrance on convennonal force capabzhties, a L)esert Storm-orchestrated conventmnal campaq can produce precise, rmpresslve desmmmn It 1s the fo~ndatmn for the fimue's preclston, ba&field-dommate war and other evolvmg forms of w&e US pl&ers must pursue But that stnke capabihty IS based on some maJor assumpnons achieved over an exthmve buildup pertod To succeed at such a feat, a nation assumes You have the luxury of sqmficant tnnb to respond, you have suficlent forces, the capabdlty to swiffly deploy them, the assets and locations I to t'ecetve and base them, and the ablirty to again achieve a Desert Storm land and aerospace super~onty Further, potennai adversanes have learned the Gulf War's lessons, the next mts ~111 present a much more fo&miabIe foe There may come a day when those assumptions and trmehnes can be "cocked" and I / fle#biy ready to execute a conventional response to a hostile nuclear detonation crisis But that day 1 far fro+ present and current conventional forces are not a cre&ble deterrent agamst an adversary's awesome I I capability of mass destruction weapons. They present a shailow threat ~rc.q~~rz among the emergmg multrpoku adversaries / /
1 The &mate US interest should be to dramaticdiy reduce, d not ehmmate, nuclear weapons and plaie greater reliance on conventional forces. Rut rt ~111 not be achieved by lgnormg the nuclear strategy debate, prematurely placmg nuclear weapons in a closet, and forgettmg the Coid War's lessons of their poeefil deterrent value. Currently, a umlateral pohcy of margmahsm would senously nsk natronai sec&ty The potential threat from Russia IS too great and from proliferated natlons too n&v. To advance theb 1 UC ear age mto a secure Mure, US leaders must accept the reahty that-1) There remams a seous I worid nudear threat; 2) Convennonal forces camtot meet this muitqolar challenge alone; 3) Nuclear weapons are a proven deterrent and the only credible force agamst such capablhtles -cooperattve nations I musk embrace not Ignore thts mternatlonai Instrument A comprehensive strategy IS desperately needed to see the nuciear age mto our new, muittlpoiar world and seize the opportumty for a more secure fixture COOPERATIVE SECURITY: THE 21ST CENTURY NUCLEAR STRATEGY Cooperative Secunty IS Amenca's 2 1 st century nuclear strategy because it breaks from the hostile strategres of a bipolar world and embraces multi-national nuciear securq, founded on growing cooperanon Thus strategy ~111 securely lead the nuclear age through the threats and opportunmes of an uncertain world The US must cease tts cutrent nuclear neglect and accept these weapons as the only credible mtlitary mstrument to deter weapons of mass destruction It has come tune for America to agam engage the nuclear debate and clearly defme a comprehensive strategy that matches the new world context
The Cooperattve Secunty strategy wail bridge the brpolar-multtpolar gap and provide a focused du-ecuon to lead from a posmon of cooperattve nuclear strength, not rgnorance Amenca must Jam W&I world nauons to; sustam a peaceful Russtan evolution and correct the growing list of emergmg mass destructron states who hold a reckless resolve and Jack nuclear drscrplme.
The Cooperauve Secunty strategy IS based on the new world context of coopenzf~on, not Cold / War coafrontatron. The suategy rs not a piecemeal approach, but gathers all components of potentral nuclear poltcy mto a comprehensive plan. Thrs cooperauon IS achreved through creatmg an allmnce among I I nuclear powers to oversee and execute policy intttattves The strategy's greatest challenge IS meetmg the seamy needs of a new multtpolar group of nuclear states with varymg arsenals and ii&ted safeguards I Hence, Cooperattve Securxty emphastzes the opportuntty to starkly reduce nuclear arsenais, and where I re u&on 1s not possible, enhance the securny of those threat envtronments 4 I This strategy IS presented assummg the most opnmtsttc geostrategtc context It is essenual that Russia and Amertca remam on the same side -not apart -of cnttcal nattonal security tssues, especutlly nuclear weapons Russra must contmue to mature as a nuclear ally, not return as an adversary Without thus matured, muittpolar US-Russtan teamwork, the Cooperatrve Secunty strategy and its dramattc nuclear I reductrons wtll fail short of completton Should muitmattonal cooperatton dramattcaily drmmtsh, thts str#egy's core prmcrples and policies must be conservatively adjusted to match the current geostrategrc reaiitles But the core prmcrples of reducmg arsenals and enhancing secunty through multrpoiar I cooperation remain lastmg precepts of this strategy and the emerging world order Fmally, the Cooperattve Secunty strategy IS based on a position of nuclear strength, nol wecl~ness I DeCptte a current low hkehhood of nuclear use. there IS tremendous potenttal for such a scenano, especrally 1 among nations with a demonstrated resolve for rash actton This strategy rehes on credible nuclear forces with an equal resolve for their alliance-supported use agatnst uncooperauve states. the respected lesson of Cold War deterrent strength 5ut unhke the Cold War's bipolar strategies thus emerging concept must address a mulnpolar set of regtonal nuclear challenges Hence, a range of sub-strategies and pokes must be ,developed, based on a specific regton's umque culture, political dynamtcs, and interests (25) These mdtttpolar force structures wrli be dehberateiy reduced as Cooperattve Secunty pokes lower the threat, bu$ thts strategy wrll not risk natxonal or mtemattonal secumy through a rash margmalii pohcy The Cooperatrve Secunty strategy IS founded upon four core pnnctpies. Cooperatrve Albance, Secunty Enhancement, Nuclear Reduction, and Unequtvocal Deterrence.
CC#OPERATIVE ALLIANCE:
2 1st century nuclear secunty is achieved through cooperattve allmnces, not adversanai standoffs. Thy strategy's success IS predrcated on effecttve world leadership by creatmg a new organuat~on, the Cooperattve Nuclear Alhance among declared and emergmg powers AlI nuclear weapons states will be we$omed and encouraged as equal partictpatmg members of the Cooperattve Nuclear Alliance, steered by a sentor counctl of experieneed nuclear superpowers The United States, Russta, Umted Kmgdom, France, and China Thrs alhance wtil be a "multrpolar nuclear NATO", the catalyst to coalesce world backmg I against reckless nuciear powers and establish greater secunty through thts strategy's core prmctples Like NATO, the alhan~e 1s based upon a gathermg of nuclear powers that share a common destre to enhance secunty and prevent nuclear use. / I I The Alliance ~111 formahze posmve cooperatton with Russta and other nuclear states as the I secunty foundation to enable dramatic nuclear arsenal reducttons It ~141 also Jomtly develop specific poliixes to act on secunty issues and provide safeguard dzsciplme among the world's new nuclear powers I I The Cooperattve Nuclear Alliance IS tbts strategy's cornerstone mechantsm to seize the unprecedented opportunity to resolve the nuclear challenge The world now needs this untque, muitmattonal secunty I orgsjntzation to cooperatively orchestrate, a one forceful voice, the growmg list of critical nuclear initiatives SE$URITY ENHANCEMENT:
The Cooperattve Secunty strategy must first succeed at creatntg greater regtonal and world securtty as a foundatron to achieve the ultimate objective of dramatic nuclear reducuons and cooperative nuclear deterrence The emerging multipolar nuclear states sorely lack the Cold War's nuclear dlsclpllne Alljance's future securny umbrella for all member states. Ehmmate all US and Russmn land-based I IC#Ms, retam a smaii portron of both nation's bomber forces as a nuclear-conventronai flexzbie mstrument for the Cooperatrve Nuclear Alhance agamst rogue natrons, piace dally aiext rehance on a six submarme SLRM force structure for both nahons. Each submarme wail deploy 24 D-5 mrssiies, 12 mrssdes with three warheads and 12 with one warhead, provrdmg a ffextble 288 warhead force. The Russmns will arrange a am i lar 300 cap SLBM warhead force. Both US and Russran submarme forces will be planned, deployed, and ioperated xn harmony as it acts as the lomt deterrent force for ail Cooperative Nuclear Aihance nations / I / * Multipolar Framework As superpower force structures are lowered, srmtlar reduction I proposals wtii be agreed to among the remammg multipolar nuclear powers. The Alliance w~ii be key to orchestratmg these reducttons mto a comprehensrve securny arrangement agreed to and shared by ail Alliance members. The focus IS to ban and ehmmate all land-based iCi3Ms and create a US-Russmn SLEM nuclear protectron umbrella for all, led by the senior council natrons. This credrble securny umbrella ~111 help ehmmate nuclear arsenals m many natrons it wrli end brpoiar standoffs and mrtiate a new; framework of shared nuclear securrty rn a world with dramatmally reduced nuclear weapons The Alliance must first develop specific near-term frameworks to engage the challenges of emergmg and undeclared stares The India-Pakrstan conflrct must be a prrorny effort ro absolve then nuclear ambtguny, declare arms ilmrts. and reduce weapons levels The Alhance wll also lend strong, formal endorsement to ongomg arms reduction efforts such as the nuclear Non-Prohferatron Treaty, the Mtsstle Technrcal Control Regnne, and the Nuclear Supplxers Group efforts These programs wril be incorporated mto the Cooperatrve Nuclear Alliance to provide a stronger world backmg and enforcement UJVEQUIVOCAL DETEDDENCE:
The US must lead from a posihon of srrength But xn a muinpolar nuclear world, It must be pint I leadershIp mcludmg the sanctton of the Cooperattve Nuclear Alinznce. Nattons who pursue xnterests th$ough the trrahonal use of mass destructron weapons wdl nor be roierored Such powers are put on notrce by; the Cooperative Nuclear Alixance, m no uncertam terms, that the Aihance's empiovment of nuclear I weapons 1s clearly on q#ron to swrftly end such an rrrahonal act. The Alhance wzil use overwhelming I force, from conventmnai to nuclear, to appropnately putush a natron f?orn crossmg the nuclear-use hne I I The Aiiru~ce will develop a protocol descnbmg stnct rules of engagement so its nuclear use I pohcy and resolve IS uneqnzvoc&y understood by all A natton resorhng to nuciear weapons use will ab.kuteZy not be tolerated As learned m the Cold War era, a credible deterrence can only be achreved through credible, responstve nuclear forces The uncertamty placed m an adversary's mind, due to the certamty of the other side's resolve, IS the best hope to stop his rash act, otherwise, the costs are too hrgb to w& achreved without a smgle nuclear shot prtmanly due to credrbie, on-alert nuclear forces, not perfect strategms But the emergmg, multxpolar world offered the luxury for Amerrcan leaders to let down its 1 strategy guard and ignore the potenual future conmbutrons of nuclear forces. Thus has now degenerated Into a risky attnude that rehes soiely on more easily understood and employed conventronal capabtirtres I that fit well lMany leaders now hold a growm, 0 vrew that nuclear weapons sene no purpose m the new world order and can even be umlaterally ehmmated They have largely tgnored the potentral threat from a precarrously evolvmg Russra who IS firmly sustamrng its mass nuclear weapons, as well as nuclear prohferatmn mto states wuh a dangerous resolve. Such a pohcy posuron poses grave nsk to mtemattonai secunty and threatens losmg a rare opportumty to achieve unprecedented future n&ear securrty NIost leaders share the ultimate mtemauonal mterest to place greater emphasis on conventtonai military forces and dramatrcally reduce, d not ehmmate, nuclear weapons. But thus can only be achieved from a posmon of strength, not nsk Whlfe the Cold War strategres centered on budding greater nuclear forces based on a confrontatmnal standoff, the Cooperattve Secunty strategy focuses on reducmg nuclear forces founded on multrpolar cooperauon. Thev common denommator Both rely on a poslaon of nuciear deterrent strength.
Cooperative Security is not the strategy that wtll close the nuclear era It is a firs step towards an I evotvmg, comprehensive strategy that reconcdes nuclear weapons wnh the new world realitms and I I embraces, not ignores, the lessons of the nuciear debate The world has an unprecedented opportumty to I I dramatmally reduce the nuclear threat -through cooperauon But to succeed, the US must create a co$prehensrve new Cooperative Securuy strategy for an uncertam world that bmlds upon the proven sedvnty of nuckear detemence whrle nattons cooperauvely red=, d not ehmmate, the nuclear age SOURCESOFREFERENCE 
